Hi Jundo,
I don't think I've ever seen proponents of the fine-tuning argument or Anthropic Principle go as far as suggesting that the universe has been fine-tuned for a particular person. Mostly they stop at regarding the existence of homo sapiens, or some carbon-based life form as the allegedly improbable fact to be explained. Those that refer to the existence of homo sapiens are rightly viewed as being anthropocentric.
The probability based argument is using prior probability rather than conditional probability:
The probability you refer to as "the outcome of an incredible series of lucky rolls of the dice" is roughly the
prior probability, taken from the time of the Big Bang, that you would be born. It's as though you could lay out all the combinations of events that could possibly happen in the universe at the age of 13.8 billion years and then ask what's the probability of a particular combination happening - the combination which includes your own birth. Obviously this probability is infinitesimal, almost 0. I'd conclude that you and I are accidents, and by the way, that homo sapiens is an accident, life on earth, planet earth, our solar system and the Milky Way galaxy are all accidents too. Unless you believe in rebirth (which I don't, but I do regard it as a perfectly defensible religious view), it doesn't make sense to say that we were lucky to be born, because before we were born, when the dice were thrown, we didn't exist to be lucky. The point of the analogy of someone banging out a long series of digits on a keyboard is that before the number is typed, the
prior probability of a particular number coming up is very small. Once you see the number, the
conditional probability of it being there is 1. Using all the knowledge we actually have now, the
conditional probability that we find ourselves where we are is exactly 1. And here we are, banging out words on a keyboard.
The fine tuning argument which uses the first (prior) type of probability is based on some highly questionable premises, such as that you can sensibly assign probabilities to the values of some fundamental physical constants. One example of an argument against this is by Colyvan, Garfield & Priest
https://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rc...uluo5oHgNcKM0g. They argue that when you try to put some probabilistic meat on the bare bones of the Fine Tuning argument, the Fine Tuning argument is shown to be a fallacy. Personally I think that if physicists don't have any idea about why the fundamental constants have the values that they do, then it's either because some form of multiverse theory is right, or the single universe theory we have is incomplete or needs a radical overhaul. Given the current state of theoretical physics, the history of science suggests that it is likely to need a radical overhaul at some point - another scientific revolution.
Your second case of the Casino is an analogy that depends on the same idea that the universe as we find it is improbable. This is exactly what the Colyvan, Garfield & Priest paper, amongst others, argues against.
Very entertaining, but again, this discussion is "nothing more than the befuddled musings of biological beings trapped in a mental straightjacket inherited from evolutionary happenstance."
Step lightly, stay free.
Jeremy
SatToday
P.S. I'm going to stop making lengthy contributions at this point because I know I'll be very busy over the next few days. Very enjoyable though